On Thursday, April 3, 2003, at 03:46 PM, Wez Furlong wrote:
>> You're right that it's a moot point for 4.3. But if we ever hope to
>> have
>> PECL seen as a useful feature/functionality, now is the time to
>> provide a
>> stable framework, not after something has gone wrong (and it doesn't
>> have
>> to be from something we/PHP have done). The potential for damage that
>> this can cause is high. It's typically harder to re-gain trust, and
>> this
>> is the cause of my hesitation to opening this up.
>
> How many third-party extensions are out there that have been compiled
> by
> someone other than our official snaps machine/Edin?
> How long have they been available?
> What about mirrors carrying win32 binaries for PHP itself?
Because it's already in practice doesn't automatically mean it's
necessarily correct either.
> Just because we have a pear command to install the binaries, it doesn't
> make things any more dangerous than they were before - the end user
> could always, at any time, download and install a bogus extension.
Because we have a pear command to download and install the binaries is
exactly the reason why we have to be careful. If you are now
auto-installing binaries without administrator interaction (beyond the
'get me this extension' idea), there had better be a way to check the
authenticity of a binary once it's been downloaded.
> We are not responsible for them doing that, and I don't see how our
> image could suffer from an idiot installing software from an unofficial
> mirror, just because we have a command line tool that helps them
> install
> it. They need to have enough brains to know the command exists, and
> then have enough brains to *type* the URL for the non-PHP.net site that
> carries the package.
You're right there is nothing we can nor should do to stop idiots from
installing unofficial extensions. But we can and should provide a
means for an administrator to verify authenticity. What's to stop
someone from claiming "go ahead install this extension, it's from PHP
website I downloaded ABC ago"? Yes I realize it's a bad admin
practice, but I also realize it happens (and sometimes it's policy).
> Signatures are useful for mirroring purposes only; they just indicate
> the binary has not been tampered with since it was signed. The
> signature does not assert anything about the reliability of the code,
> unless we put into place a full blown audit of all PECL packages and
> sign with a different certificate. This will probably become too much
> of a burden for our volunteer network, particularly as PECL grows.
I disagree with regards to signatures, they are not useful for
mirroring only.
I'm not arguing the reliability of the code, I'm arguing towards the
validity of the download. The idea of the signature is exactly what I
would like to see put in place (along with the hash inside the
signature) before this is put to regular use.
> So, its a pretty safe bet that any binaries built by the official
> php.net snaps machine are "certified". So why not make them available
> via snaps.php.net?
Go ahead make them available. I'd much rather seem them signed and
certified before they are made available though.
> We only really need digital signatures on officially released packages.
At the very least on officially released packages.
>---------------------------------------------------------------<
Dan Kalowsky "I got my mojo working, but it
http://www.deadmime.org/~dank just ain't working on you"
dank-nom@aps-deadmime.org - "Mojo",
kalowsky@php.net Muddy Waters